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Learning Each Other’s Language: 
Doctrine as a Potential Mechanism for Enhancing Cooperation and Interoperability 
between the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Defence Force 
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Abstract 
With militaries and police comprising the majority of personnel deployed during 
increasingly complex and diverse multinational interventions, there is a need for 
significantly improved cooperation and interoperability.  Focusing on Australia’s police 
and military forces in the international arena, this paper considers doctrine as a tool to 
enhance collaboration. It points to progress made towards cooperation and 
interoperability, areas requiring development, and areas where coherent practice is 
neither achievable nor desirable.  The authors argue that both agencies need to review 
and realign their doctrine to form a common conceptual foundation to guide the 
interagency aspects of their operations, and that this will be vital to enhancing police and 
military collaboration and performance, particularly in emergencies.  
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years the number of agencies involved in multinational interventions, particularly 
peacekeeping, has greatly expanded. This is due largely to a broadening of the objectives of 
such operations, which today encompass state-building and government-sector reform, as well 
as the more traditional objective of security provision. Similarly, the context for these 
operations is becoming increasingly complex, often with high levels of residual conflict or 
volatility. While militaries comprise the highest proportion of United Nations peacekeeping 
mission personnel, civilian police are now the next highest number.
2
 As a result there is now a 
need for a much higher level of military-police cooperation and interoperability during these 
operations than has previously been the case.
3
 While cooperation has generally been 
satisfactory, it could be further improved by enhancing the structural framework for 
cooperation. The mechanisms for improving interoperability – which represents much closer 
collaboration – could also be further developed.4 
 
Starting with a brief overview of theoretical approaches to fostering cooperation between 
police and militaries in multinational interventions, this paper then turns to the case of 
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1
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2
 United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (“The Brahimi Report”, October 
2000), <www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/report.htm> [Accessed 2 August 2010]. 
3
 The subtle difference between cooperation and interoperability is important, and is elaborated within the 
Theoretical Approaches section. 
4
 See, for example: Andrew Goldsmith & Vandra Harris, ‘Police-Military Cooperation in Foreign Interventions: 
Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands’ in F. Lemieux (ed.) International Police Cooperation: Emerging Issues, 
Theory and Practice (Willan: Collumpton, 2010), pp. 221-237; Mahesh K. Nalla, Joseph D. Johnson & Gorazd 
Mesko, ‘Are Police and Security Personnel Warming up to Each Other? A Comparison of Officers’ Attitudes in 
Developed, Emerging, and Transitional Economies’, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & 
Management, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2009), pp. 508-525. 
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cooperation between the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Defence Force 
(ADF) in the international arena. As will be expanded below, the AFP and ADF are presently 
at the forefront of innovation in the areas of interagency cooperation and interoperability and 
therefore present an excellent case study. In examining the nature, requirements and history of 
cooperation and interoperability between these two agencies we focus first on arrangements 
for cooperation during peacekeeping and intervention operations such as those in Timor-Leste 
and Solomon Islands. Discussion then turns to mechanisms to enable broader structural and 
policy-level cooperation and interoperability. 
 
This paper argues that the AFP and ADF need to review and realign their doctrine, in order to 
form a common conceptual foundation to guide these agencies’ respective operations.5 
Although limited steps have already been taken in this regard, they represent a starting point 
rather than achievement of an enduring solution. Finally, the paper points to areas where 
coherent practice is neither achievable nor desirable, identifying strategies for enhancing 
communication and collaboration around such issues. 
 
Intervention, Cooperation and Interoperability: Theoretical approaches 
 
International interventions are enacted in a wide variety of contexts. The complexity and 
dynamism of the environment in which interventions take place is being increasingly 
recognised by commentators and practitioners, and it demands both flexibility and an 
enormous range of skills from the men and women who serve in police and military forces. 
As Eaton notes, “the complex physical, human and informational terrain of modern peace and 
stability operations is often engulfed by a humanitarian disaster that is perpetuated by the 
collapse of indigenous government, law enforcement, security, judicial and administrative 
frameworks”.6   
 
Under normal circumstances the role of police is to “reinforce a legal authority that is 
[already] in existence”, while in contrast the role of the military includes operating “at times 
when that authority is being contested”.7 The changing security environment signified in part 
by the end of the Cold War and subsequently by responses to the 11 September 2001 terrorist 
attacks against America, has eroded the separation between police and military roles, as 
demonstrated in the reality of concurrent deployments of these forces during international 
interventions.
8
 
 
In recent decades, Australia has contributed police and/or military personnel to a range of 
international interventions, including stabilisation, capacity building, emergency response, 
peacekeeping, state-building and active conflict operations. In most of these environments, 
Australian police and military personnel have worked alongside forces from other countries, 
                                                 
5
 We also argue that while the AFP does not have written doctrine manuals, it does have practices and 
conventions that constitute a form of doctrine, as will be discussed below. 
6
 Damian Eaton, ‘The Role of the Military Police in Enhancing ADF-AFP Interoperability on Peace and Stability 
Operations’, Australian Army Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Autumn 2009), p. 59. 
7
 Beth Greener, The New International Policing (Houndmills & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 105. 
8
 Peter Andreas & Richard Price, ‘From War-fighting to Crime Fighting: Transforming the American National 
Security State’, International Studies Review, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Fall 2001), p. 32. 
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as well as a range of other agencies and organisations. International and interagency 
cooperation constitute significant challenges for the parties involved.
9
 
 
Cooperation and interoperability might appear both logical and straightforward for highly 
ordered organisations such as these, especially in light of the tendency for police forces to be 
organised similarly to militaries.
10
 In reality, however, there are significant differences 
between these organisations that can interfere not only with cooperation but also with basic 
communication. Organisational differences are particularly important with regard to mandate 
and practice: while the military has an external (beyond the state) orientation, authorisation to 
use deadly force, and is organised around “hierarchy, discipline and teamwork”, police have 
an internal (intra-state) orientation, are tasked with preventing and responding to crime, and 
operate individually or in small teams in environments that allow (and require) the exercise of 
discretion.
11
 
 
While the environments of international interventions are often referred to as “post-conflict” 
by the time police-military cooperation becomes an operational consideration, the level of 
violence often remains significantly higher than that normally encountered by Western 
police,
12
 although lower than the war zone of traditional military engagement. This means that 
both forces encounter the liminal spaces described by Alice Hills. The first of these is a 
“deployment gap”, in which “the severe breakdown of law and order characteristic of post-
conflict situations” may prevent or severely inhibit police deployment, with the result that 
military “troops are expected to enforce basic order … at least until CIVPOL [multinational 
civilian police] are able to operate effectively”.13 The second space is an “enforcement gap”, 
which is the “relative and controversial” space between those tasks that are easily 
differentiated as police or military tasks.
14
 
 
Despite suggestions that police and militaries are becoming more alike,
15
 few commentators 
suggest that these post-conflict tasks can be performed by a single force – whether police or 
military – recognising instead that the transition from serious conflict to stable peace requires 
                                                 
9
 See for example Andrew Goldsmith & Vandra Harris ‘Out of Step: Multilateral Police Missions, Culture and 
Nation-building in Timor-Leste’, Conflict, Security and Development, Vol. 9, No. 2 (June 2009), pp. 189-212; 
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10
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Proper Role of Foreign Militaries’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June 2007), pp. 
231-247. 
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 Andrew Goldsmith, ‘“It Wasn't like Normal Policing”: Voices of Australian Police Peacekeepers in Operation 
Serene, Timor-Leste 2006’, Policing and Society, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2009), pp. 119-133. 
13
 Hills, ‘The Inherent Limits of Military Forces in Policing Peace Operations’, p. 80. 
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 Ibid, p. 95. 
15
 See, for example: Edward R. Maguire & William R. King, ‘Trends in the Policing Industry’, Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 593 (May 2004), pp. 15-41; Alan J. Vick, David T. 
Orletsky, Abram N. Shulsky & John Stillion, Preparing the U.S. Air Force for Military Operations Other than 
War (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997), p. 2. 
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diverse skills and approaches.
16
 Police and military forces in international operations must 
therefore negotiate the transitional zone and the spaces that characterise it, as well as 
cooperating in enacting their more clearly distinguished tasks. This is further complicated by 
the fact that international deployment is a relatively novel and challenging context for most 
national police forces.  
 
Furthermore, the difference between cooperation and interoperability is subtle, but important. 
Cooperation refers to instances where the police and military work together to achieve a 
common goal. Interoperability refers to the ability of the two organisations to work together 
as a result of aligned, integrated or exchangeable processes, systems or services. 
Interoperability measures are generally implemented officially and as a result are more likely 
to have enduring effects.  Cooperation, on the other hand, may be ad hoc and examples are 
often local and task orientated. Exploring this issue in relation to AFP-ADF cooperation 
during the international intervention in Timor-Leste, Goldsmith and Harris note that 
integrative cooperation – “pursuing the same goals by different (or even not so different) 
means” – and complementary cooperation – “to achieve their distinct, respective goals” – are 
both important to achieving interoperability.
17
  
 
Arrangements for AFP/ADF operational cooperation and interoperability 
 
While the ADF has traditionally been geared towards international deployment, as previously 
noted this is a relatively new area of operation for the AFP.  The establishment of readily 
deployable national police groups was recommended in the UN Report on Peacekeeping 
Operations (“The Brahimi Report”) and Australia has played “a pioneering role” in 
responding to this by establishing the AFP International Deployment Group (IDG).
18
 Thus, 
the IDG has had to create its own path in terms of developing effective mechanisms for 
overcoming the various challenges of international policing, including collaboration with 
militaries. 
 
Australia has provided a small number of police (currently 15) to the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) continually since 1964.
19
 However, it was not 
until the establishment of the IDG in 2004 that international policing was recognised as a core 
component of Australia’s policing commitment and Australian police found themselves 
“operating in a foreign policy space”.20 With 900 staff (of an authorised 1 200), the IDG has 
three core components: an Australia-based component; a mission component; and an 
Operational Response Group (for rapid deployment to critical situations).
21
 The mission 
                                                 
16
 An exception is Mortlock, who claims that military training fully provides the capabilities necessary for 
transition to peace.  Roger Mortlock, ‘The Role of the Military’ in J. Henderson & G. Watson (eds.), Securing a 
Peaceful Pacific (Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 2005), pp. 205-213, esp. p. 209. 
17
 Goldsmith & Harris, ‘Police-Military Cooperation in Foreign Interventions’, p. 225. 
18
 United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report); John 
McFarlane, ‘The Thin Blue Line: The Strategic Role of the Australian Federal Police’, Security Challenges, Vol. 
3, No. 3 (2007), pp. 91-108, esp. p. 104. 
19
 Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2009-10 (Canberra: Australian Federal Police, 2010), p. 95. 
20
 Mick Keelty, ‘Operating in a Foreign Policy Space’, Platypus: Journal of the Australian Federal Police, No. 
93 (December 2006), pp. 7-15. 
21
 Australian Federal Police, International Deployment Group, <http://www.afp.gov.au/policing/international-
deployment-group.aspx> [Accessed 5 September 2010]. 
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component accounts for 81 per cent of IDG resources, and its work includes commitments in 
eleven foreign countries, as well in Australia’s remote external territories and emergency 
response in Australia’s Northern Territory.22 
 
In this context, the AFP and ADF have a well-established track record of cooperation during 
intervention operations, with both organisations being deployed as part of the same operation 
on several occasions. The most prominent examples of these operations are those being 
conducted in Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands, which are illustrative of the nature and extent 
of AFP/ADF operational cooperation and interoperability to date. 
 
Australia’s police and military involvement in Timor-Leste followed the 1999 referendum in 
which citizens voted for independence from Indonesia. The Australian military was deployed 
there in 1999 pending the commencement of a series of UN missions.
23
 From February 2000 
until May 2006 the ADF contributed personnel as part of the UN Joint Task Force. Operations 
then transitioned to the International Stabilisation Force, which is ongoing under ADF 
leadership.
24
 The AFP deployment has been primarily within the bounds of the UN Police 
(UNPOL) deployment, supplemented by a bilateral program of police development (the 
Timor-Leste Police Development Program, or TLPDP).
25
 
 
Australia has contributed to the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
since 2003.
26
 Together with fourteen other Pacific nations, Australia’s contribution includes 
police in the Participating Police Force (PPF) and military personnel in a Combined Task 
Force (CTF). As with the missions in Timor-Leste, RAMSI has evolved through a series of 
stages and has experienced periods of major civil unrest, however the RAMSI leadership and 
structure have been more consistent than that in Timor-Leste (it is noteworthy that the AFP is 
currently the lead agency in RAMSI; this is an unprecedented role for a police force). 
Although the police and military deployments have been mostly parallel there have been 
periods of much closer collaboration, including conducting joint patrols during periods of 
major unrest.
27
 
 
During periods of significant conflict in these (and other) countries, the military has usually 
taken the lead in the conduct of operations. As conflict has settled and police have begun to be 
able to undertake their role without military protection or augmentation, leadership 
arrangements have often been more ad hoc.
28
 Although it has been argued that the success of 
                                                 
22
 Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2009-10. The countries are Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands, Papua 
New Guinea, Afghanistan, Nauru, Vanuatu, Cyprus, Sudan, Cambodia, Samoa and Tonga. 
23
 Bob Breen, Mission Accomplished East Timor: The Australian Defence Force Participation in the 
International Forces East Timor (INTERFET) (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2000), provides an account of the 
Australian military’s pre-UN mission deployment to East Timor (from September 1999 until February 2000). 
24
 Grant Edwards & Tess O’Donnell, ‘Timor-Leste Police Development Program (TLPDP): Lessons in Capacity 
Building Approaches’ in Vandra Harris and Andrew Goldsmith (eds), Security, Development and Nation-
Building in Timor-Leste: Cross-sectoral Perspectives (Routledge: London, 2011 forthcoming). 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 RAMSI, RAMSI – Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands, <www.ramsi.org> [Accessed 22 October 
2010]. 
27
 Goldsmith & Harris, ‘Police-Military Cooperation in Foreign Interventions’, pp. 221-237; Greener, The New 
International Policing, 113; Greener-Barcham, ‘Crossing the Green or Blue Line?’, pp. 90-112. 
28
 Goldsmith, ‘“It Wasn't like Normal Policing”’, p. 123; Abby McLeod & Sinclair Dinnen, ‘Police Building in 
the Southwest Pacific – New Directions in Australian Regional Policing’ in A. Goldsmith & J. Sheptycki (eds.), 
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this approach is largely due to a clear understanding by both agencies of the distinction 
between police and military roles,
29
 the reality is that these distinctions are blurred in 
operations conducted in the liminal spaces of transition. Furthermore, at the more formal level 
there is much work yet to be done to ensure the optimisation of operational cooperation and 
interoperability during both combined and parallel activities.
30
 
 
As always, there is some distance between policy and “on-the-ground” experiences.  
Goldsmith and Harris have discussed the practical challenges from a police perspective, 
reporting the experiences of AFP personnel in their attempts to work together with the ADF 
and with police from other nations. While AFP officers described extensive difficulties 
collaborating in post-conflict international missions, they described relationships with the 
ADF as amongst the most constructive they experienced. In spite of difficulties that emerged 
around different levels of force, approaches to planning, and sharing of intelligence, 
Australian police praised the ADF logistical capacity, preparation and ability to build 
relationships with local people. On the basis of such experiences, Goldsmith and Harris 
conclude that “the need for doctrine in this area is well-recognized and is particularly 
necessary if complementary cooperation remains the principal orientation” of missions in 
countries such as Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands.
31
 
 
Mechanisms that enable AFP/ADF structural and policy level cooperation and 
interoperability 
 
As well as on-the-ground cooperation during the conduct of intervention operations in places 
such as Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands, the AFP and ADF have commenced extensive 
programs within Australia to enhance their cooperation at the structural and policy levels. In 
particular, the establishment of the IDG acted as a catalyst for bringing about the 
consolidation of AFP/ADF cooperation and interoperability outside of specific operational 
theatres. 
 
The IDG Future Strategy, which was approved in August 2006, greatly enhanced the 
capabilities of the IDG. It directed the formation of a 150 person Operation Response Group, 
able to undertake rapid deployment in the event of an international crisis or emergency, 
authorised an increase in the IDG staffing levels to 1 200, and increased the IDG funding by 
$AU493.2 million.
32
 Most importantly from an interoperability perspective, it included the 
creation of an AFP “operation planning cell” to foster a close partnership with the ADF and 
“ensure consistency in application, thinking and operation planning areas reflecting ongoing 
learning”.33 
                                                                                                                                                        
Crafting Transnational Policing: Police Capacity-Building and Global Policing Reform (Oxford: Hart, 2007), 
pp. 295-328. 
29
 Elsa Wainwright, Police Join the Front Line, Strategic Insights No. 1 (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, 2004), p. 6. 
30
 In this context the term ‘parallel activities’ refers to instances when the AFP and ADF operate separately along 
their traditional division of roles, but do so concurrently and within the same sphere. 
31
 Goldsmith & Harris, ‘Police-Military Cooperation in Foreign Interventions’, p. 235. 
32
 Australian National Audit Office, Australian Federal Police Overseas Operations, Audit Report No. 53, 2006-
07, p. 118. 
33
 Juani O’Reilly & Paul Jevtovic, ‘Policing the Neighbourhood and Keeping Peace in the Pacific’, Platypus: 
Journal of the Australian Federal Police, No. 96 (September 2007), pp. 11-12. 
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In the same month, the National Security Committee of Cabinet directed a review of 
interoperability between the Australian Department of Defence and the AFP. The review, 
which was conducted during 2007, was guided jointly by the AFP and Defence and focused 
on stabilisation operations. The focus of subsequent investigation moved to interoperability 
for offshore operations more broadly. This culminated in the signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding on Interoperability between the Department of Defence and the Australian 
Federal Police (the MOU) in September 2008.
34
 
 
To date both organisations continue to adhere to the principle of enhancing interoperability 
that was formally established by the MOU, and this has allowed the AFP and ADF to make 
great inroads into achieving interoperability at the structural and policy level. For example, 
they have subsequently established a Joint Steering Committee (JSC), the primary role of 
which is to enhance their interoperability by developing and updating policies, procedures and 
administrative processes.
35
 
 
Defence personnel have previously been posted to fill temporary appointments within the 
IDG and ongoing interoperability is achieved by the posting of AFP officers to key positions 
within ADF organisations. Specifically, the AFP has committed to posting two Liaison 
Officers to the ADF Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) and up to three 
members to undertake courses run by the Australian Defence College.
36
 The HQJOC Liaison 
Officers in particular are responsible for providing advice to the ADF during planning for 
major interagency operations such as those in Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands, and for 
organising for subject matter experts from within the AFP to provide specialist advice to the 
ADF where appropriate. 
 
Recently, another key step towards achieving cooperation has been the development of the 
Guide to Defence and Australian Federal Police (International Deployment Group) 
Interoperability for Offshore Operations (“the Guide”). Following formal recognition by the 
JSC of the need to develop a common language and of the requirement to enhance joint 
approaches to operational planning, development of the Guide commenced in early 2009, and 
is ongoing at the time of writing of this paper. It is intended that the Guide will establish a 
framework for AFP (specifically IDG) and ADF cooperation during offshore operations. 
Importantly, its scope will be limited, and although it discusses several topics that relate to 
interoperability, it does not include any tactical guidance. Furthermore, it is made clear within 
the Guide itself that it is not a doctrine manual.
37
 
 
Conceptualisations of Doctrine 
                                                 
34
 Australian Department of the Defence and Australian Federal Police, Memorandum of Understanding on 
Interoperability between the Department of Defence and the Australian Federal Police Force, signed 26 
September 2008. 
35
 Australian Federal Police, Annual Report 2008-09 (Canberra: Australian Federal Police, 2009), p. 65. 
36
 Australian Federal Police, Australian Federal Police Submission to The Senate Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Inquiry Into Australia’s Involvement In Peacekeeping Operations (March 
2007), p. 10. 
37
 Australian Department of Defence & Australian Federal Police, Guide to Defence and Australian Federal 
Police (International Deployment Group) Interoperability for Offshore Operations (unpublished draft, dated 
January 2011). Importantly, the non-doctrinal status of the Guide is unlikely to change, even as its development 
progresses. 
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As a result of the aforementioned measures, the AFP and ADF are presently at the forefront 
of innovation in the areas of interagency cooperation and interoperability. Despite this, neither 
organisation has yet produced any doctrine intended to enhance interoperability, or even to 
provide guidance for interagency cooperation. This is despite an assertion by the National 
Manager of the IDG in 2007 that the AFP and ADF “need common ground in the areas of 
doctrine and communication”, a call that has been reinforced by members of the academic 
community.
38
 Before discussing potential means of closing this gap, it is pertinent to address 
the nature and definition of the term “doctrine” in greater depth. 
 
In the ADF, doctrine is officially defined as “fundamental principles by which military forces 
or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives”, with the added 
caveat that “it is authoritative but requires judgement in application”.39 Contemporary military 
doctrine has a lineage dating to the publication of drill manuals early in the seventeenth 
century and its precise character and role have since been the subject of much scrutiny, at 
least within militaries themselves.
40
 Notwithstanding the official definition of the term, the 
nature and application of contemporary military doctrine is the result of several conventions 
of prolonged gestation, which have come to be generally if informally accepted within the 
military profession. 
 
The first accepted convention is that military doctrine is written down.
41
 In the ADF, and in 
the militaries of most other English-speaking countries, each of the three Services (navy, 
army and air force) maintains its own series of written doctrine manuals, with the ADF 
maintaining a fourth series of inter-service “joint” doctrine manuals.42 The second convention 
is that doctrine is officially sanctioned, and doctrine manuals usually require endorsement by 
the Chief of a Service (or his/her delegate) prior to publication.
43
 Third, military doctrine is 
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 O’Reilly & Jevtovic, ‘Policing the Neighbourhood and Keeping Peace in the Pacific’, pp. 13-14; Goldsmith & 
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Paper No. 33 (United Kingdom: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, May 1998); Markus Mader, In Pursuit 
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2002, Studies in Contemporary History and Security Policy No. 13 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2004). 
41
 Paul Johnston, ‘Doctrine is not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behaviour of Armies’, Parameters, 
Vol. 30, No. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 30-31. 
42
 In the military context, the term “joint” means “activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at 
least two Services participate”. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), NATO-Russia Glossary of 
Contemporary Political and Military Terms (Brussels: NATO-Russia Joint Editorial Working Group, undated 
but promulgated online on 8 June 2001), <https://www.nato.int/docu/glossary/eng/index.htm> [Accessed 20 
December 2008], p. 107. 
43
 In the case of ADF joint doctrine, this approval is indicated by the Chief of Defence Force’s signature 
appearing on the first page of every joint doctrine manual published. Each of the three Services’ doctrine 
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considered to be different from strategy, principles, concepts, theories and lessons learned – a 
definitional separation that can be quite confusing to those unfamiliar with the nuances of 
military terminology.
44
 This confusion can be further compounded by the routine inclusion 
within doctrine of a discretionary and quite deliberately chosen selection of principles, 
concepts and theories, supplemented by examples derived from lessons learned on previous 
operations. 
 
Together these three conventions contribute to a fourth: that military doctrine provides a 
statement of institutionally accepted principles, concepts and theories, which together are 
considered to constitute accepted military “best practice”. Conversely, this convention implies 
that intentional omission from doctrine can constitute an indication that a particular principle, 
concept or theory has been institutionally rejected by the military.
45
 
 
Importantly, the nature of doctrine is pragmatically determined by its intended use. The 
promulgation of institutionally sanctioned principles and concepts to guide best practice is not 
considered to be an end in itself. On the contrary, doctrine serves the important function of 
providing guidance for the planning and conduct of a variety of military operations. To this 
end, doctrine manuals are usually grouped according to the level at which the guidance they 
provide is pitched, with the commonly accepted levels being military-strategic, operational 
and tactical.
46
 
 
The AFP, on the other hand, adheres to a far less developed conceptualisation of doctrine. In 
marked contrast to militaries, little if anything has been written about doctrine as it applies to, 
or within, police forces.
47
 Furthermore, it has been difficult to identify a commonly accepted 
definition of the term within the AFP itself. While some officers state that the AFP does not 
have doctrine at all, others state that it does, but that its doctrine is referred to as procedures, 
guidelines or Commissioners’ Orders. Regardless of this discrepancy it is clear that the AFP 
does not have doctrine in the sense that the military does. Indeed, even those officers who 
stated that the AFP has doctrine by other names acknowledged that this doctrine does not 
perform the same function as military doctrine. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
manuals includes a similar indicator (usually the signature of the Chief of the Service), as is the case for the 
doctrine manuals published by other English-speaking militaries. 
44
 I. B. Holley, ‘Concepts, Doctrines, Principles: Are You Sure You Understand These Terms?’, Air University 
Review (July-August 1984), <http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1984/jul-
aug/holley.html> [Accessed 31 January 2008]; Johnston, ‘Doctrine is not Enough’, p. 31. 
45
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General James Mattis, then Commander of US Joint Forces Command. General James Mattis, Memorandum for 
US Joint Forces Command: Assessment of Effects Based Operations, Commander’s guidance to US Joint Forces 
Command (unpublished, dated 14 August 2008), 
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/usjfcomebomemo.pdf> [Accessed 11 March 2010]; Robert S. Dudney, 
‘Editorial: Improvisation Won’t Do’, US Air Force Magazine (2 October 2008), p. 2. 
46
 Gordon R. Peskett, ‘Levels of War: A New Canadian Model to Begin the 21st Century’ in: Allan English, 
Daniel Gosselin, Howard Coombs & Laurence M. Hickey (eds.), The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives: 
Context and Concepts (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2005), pp. 97-127. 
47
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In particular, the AFP does not capture and disseminate tactical and operational lessons in the 
way that the military does through its doctrine. Instead, operational lessons learned are 
captured in post activity reports, and in addition tactical lessons are often passed on 
informally from officer to officer. In the case of tactics, this mechanism was generally 
preferred over the military doctrinal mechanism due to the perception that military-style 
doctrine has the potential to impede the initiative and lateral thinking required to successfully 
conduct policing activities. 
 
Another noteworthy difference between the AFP and the ADF is that the “levels” the ADF 
uses to group its doctrine do not necessarily apply to police operations: some AFP officers 
expressed the view that AFP activities typically have effects at each of what the military 
would call the tactical, operational and military-strategic levels, and that these activities are 
generally planned in a more integrated manner, with effects at all of these levels taken into 
account.
48
 Importantly these officers asserted that, regardless of this difference, doctrine that 
establishes broad, guiding principles (in a similar fashion to ADF operational and military-
strategic level doctrine) could be useful for guiding planning aspects of IDG activities, 
providing that it is not overly prescriptive.
49
 
 
Doctrine as a mechanism for enhancing AFP/ADF cooperation and interoperability 
 
How then can doctrine become a mechanism for further enhancing cooperation and 
interoperability between the AFP and ADF? This paper contends that it will improve 
understanding of the jargon implicit in the day-to-day language (and, figuratively, the 
behavioural jargon) of each organisation, thereby minimising miscommunication and ensuing 
problems, as well as constituting a firm foundation on which to base further cooperation and 
efforts towards enhanced interoperability. In short, there is a need for the military to learn the 
AFP’s doctrinal language, and for the AFP to learn that of the military. This will require a 
different approach for each organisation. 
 
Turning first to the AFP, the development of a greater understanding of the military approach 
to doctrine and its application should be considered as a key starting point. By the military 
definition of the term, it is clear that the AFP is not a “doctrine-based organisation” in the way 
that the military is.
50
 For the AFP, developing an institutional appreciation of the significance 
of this facet of military culture is vital because it will improve the organisation’s ability to 
understand and communicate with the ADF. Efforts to achieve this will need to incorporate 
                                                 
48
 It must be noted that although the “levels” are used by the ADF as a mechanism to assist in the 
conceptualisation of military activities, they are by no means viewed as rigid or universally applicable. Indeed, it 
has recently been acknowledged that cross-level effects are increasingly common due to the proliferation of 
communications technology and media scrutiny of military operations. The attitudinal difference between AFP 
and ADF officers to this concept may therefore be a function of organisational size and of the different 
traditional roles of each organisation. Peskett, ‘Levels of War’, pp. 97-127; P. W. Singer, ‘Tactical Generals: 
Leaders, Technology, and the Perils of Battlefield Micromanagement’, Air and Space Power Journal, Vol. 23, 
No. 2 (Summer 2009), pp. 78-87; Charles C. Krulak, ‘The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block 
War’, Marines Magazine, January 1999, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/strategic_corporal.htm> 
[Accessed 12 October 2010]. 
49
 The officers who expressed this view noted the difference between IDG activities and those of other branches 
of the AFP. Their comments about the potential use of doctrine to aid operational planning were specific to the 
IDG. 
50
 The term “doctrine-based organisation” has been borrowed from: US Army Combined Arms Centre, Doctrine 
Development, <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/doctrine.asp> [Accessed 8 August 2010]. 
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raising awareness, which could be achieved by incorporating briefs about the military 
understanding and application of doctrine into AFP training courses. It is not critical that AFP 
officers become intimately familiar with ADF doctrine, but rather that they understand the 
role and standing of doctrine within the ADF, because this will enhance their understanding 
of the ADF itself. Although senior members of the IDG work closely with serving and former 
military personnel, operational officers are less likely to have the same depth of exposure to 
their military counterparts, and therefore constitute a key target of this work. 
 
Given the significance of doctrine to militaries, the development of an AFP (or IDG) doctrine 
manual for offshore operations could constitute a mechanism for enhancing the appreciation 
military personnel have of AFP operating philosophies and practices. Such an innovation 
would need to meet a few key criteria to be accepted by members of the AFP while also being 
useful to the ADF, and to ensure it is able to achieve the goal of enhancing interoperability. 
 
While the label “doctrine” would make the significance of such a manual immediately 
recognisable to ADF personnel, it may not be the most useful term from a police perspective. 
In light of the police need for flexibility and responsiveness, terminology such as 
“fundamental principles” could be more appropriate to AFP usage. Importantly, this term 
borrows from the ADF’s definition of doctrine, and so would emphasise the nature of its 
standing within the AFP while still assisting ADF personnel to identify the document as an 
equivalent to their own doctrine. An “equivalency statement” or similar, placed prominently 
in the front matter of the manual, would greatly assist in this identification, as ADF personnel 
are generally so well accustomed to labelling such a document as “doctrine” that they may 
otherwise fail to recognise the equivalency in the first instance. Such a statement may also 
help to deepen AFP officers’ understanding of the nature of military doctrine and the role it 
could play in increasing cooperation. 
 
Whatever term were used, it would be necessary to include a carefully composed statement 
clarifying the precise intent, function and definition of any such document. This would assist 
in it gaining acceptance amongst AFP officers, who are generally wary of the military 
conceptualisation of doctrine on the grounds that it is overly-prescriptive and therefore ill-
suited to police operations. Such reservations are entirely understandable given the different 
nature of police and military roles and approaches, however there could be little argument that 
Australian policing is founded on agreed principles that could be gathered in such a volume 
without unnecessarily restricting officers’ freedom within this broader conceptual framework. 
 
It is noteworthy that an almost identical concern about doctrine has traditionally existed 
within most English-speaking navies, and that this concern has been progressively overcome 
within the past two decades. Indeed, since the mid-1990s navies have increasingly embraced 
doctrine as a mechanism for explaining to outsiders their role and its importance as a 
component of national strategy.
51
 It may be useful if the AFP approached the development of 
doctrine manuals with a similar intent in mind. It is therefore noteworthy that, in the words of 
Michael Codner, navy doctrine achieves its intent by offering “what is essentially a 
conceptual framework distilling wisdom from the corpus of work on maritime strategic 
theory”.52 
                                                 
51
 Mader, In Pursuit of Conceptual Excellence, pp. 154-176; Jackson, Keystone Doctrine Development in Five 
Commonwealth Navies, pp. 67-70. 
52
 Michael Codner, ‘Purple Prose and Purple Passion: The Joint Defence Centre’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 144, No. 1 
(February/March 1999), p. 38. 
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On this basis, an AFP doctrine manual could be limited to providing an overview of the 
fundamental principles and philosophies of international policing, and giving a description of 
the roles and functions of a police force in the context of multinational interventions such as 
peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Providing the manual was written and formatted 
in such a way that it would be recognisable to ADF personnel as “doctrine”, the provision of 
this high-level yet limited information could go a long way towards enhancing cooperation 
and interoperability, as it would enable ADF personnel to digest crucial background 
information about the AFP in a format they would appreciate as significant. Furthermore, 
detailing a broad set of principles and philosophies would avoid prescription, making the 
manual both useful and more acceptable to AFP officers themselves. 
 
On the flip side of the coin, ADF personnel could benefit by developing an increased 
understanding of the culture of the AFP and the approach that organisation takes to doctrine. 
From their inception, police forces have had a different focus than militaries, which 
Goldsmith and Harris summarised as “the criminal-evidential focus of the police, compared 
to the war-fighting/tactical victory orientation of the military”.53 As a result of this different 
focus, the approach of each organisation to similar areas of endeavour has evolved in 
divergent ways – not least with respect to the lead-time and approach to planning for 
operations, and the flexibility and decision-making power available to lower level staff in 
each organisation. 
 
These differences have in turn shaped the perspective from which each organisation views the 
other in the context of cooperation and interoperability. The issue of operational planning 
presents a good example of the difference: a tendency on the part of some military personnel 
to perceive the AFP as reactionary rather than planning-focused can be contrasted with a 
perspective amongst AFP officers that their organisation is planning-focused but in a less 
rigid manner than the military.
54
 
 
The criminal-evidential focus of the AFP has been vital in shaping the perceptions that AFP 
officers hold about doctrine. Although the AFP is not a “doctrine-based organisation” in the 
military sense, it nonetheless employs similar mechanisms for distributing information: 
guidelines and orders, which it supplements with an informal and flexible (although 
sometimes ad hoc) approach to disseminating tactical lessons learned. An enhanced 
understanding of the ethos of police operations and the AFP organisational culture would 
assist military personnel to appreciate the significance of this approach, with the potential to 
lead to a more flexible conceptualisation of doctrine by military personnel. This in turn would 
encourage attitudes conducive to fostering enhanced cooperation and interoperability. 
 
Over the course of the past few centuries, military doctrine has become increasingly 
formalised and as a result the military understanding and conceptualisation of doctrine has 
become less flexible. A return to a previous doctrinal paradigm is therefore warranted when 
interacting with the AFP. For example, Gary Sheffield observed in the case of the British 
Army that: 
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While some armed forces have been famed for their doctrinal approach, until 1989 the 
British Army was not one of them. Largely eschewing formal, written doctrine, the Army 
made a cult of pragmatism, flexibility and an empirical approach … That is not to say 
that the British Army entirely neglected “doctrine”, broadly defined, in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. However, doctrine tended to be semi-formal at best; was centred 
around one individual commander or existed in a specific set of circumstances … and 
was not necessarily easily transferrable elsewhere; and in some cases it was more 
honoured in the breach than the observance.
55
 
This description could also be applied to the current practices of the AFP and, owing to its 
British lineage, the Australian Army – indeed the entire ADF – has previously employed this 
conceptualisation of doctrine.
56
 Developing a deeper understanding of their own doctrinal 
history may thus be a key to enabling ADF personnel to develop a better appreciation of the 
approach taken by the AFP.   
 
It should also be observed that this proposal risks being accused of asking the AFP to make a 
greater effort than the ADF to facilitate improved cooperation.  This is partly due to the fact 
that the ADF already has doctrine manuals that other government agencies can consult to 
develop a better understanding of its operational planning and practices. Our suggestion is 
that police develop a volume similar to the ADF’s highest level, or “capstone” doctrine 
manual, and that both organisations be encouraged to take greater account of these documents 
when attempting to work better together. This would complement the range of practical 
strategies already being undertaken (as outlined above). 
 
Doctrine and the limits of cooperation 
 
An important final point is that this paper by no means advocates using doctrine to further 
blur the distinction between police and military practices. The characteristic differences of 
each organisation are critical to the normal functioning of a state. Ignoring these during 
intervention operations would detract from positive long term outcomes for the host state.
57
 
As Wainwright notes, in peace operations the military has a clear role “to establish control, 
and to prevent warring parties and insurgents from undermining efforts to rebuild a state”, in 
contrast to the police roles of maintaining law and order, conducting criminal investigations, 
police-building, and building confidence in the rule of law.
58
 
 
This role distinction can be seen in the practical example of the approach each organisation 
takes to the conduct of patrols: the level of planning and control applied by the military is 
critical to the protection of personnel in conflict situations, while the flexibility available to 
police during their patrols is key to their crime prevention, investigation and arrest functions. 
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While these tasks are mutually reinforcing and complementary, the distinctions can constitute 
a challenge when joint patrols are called for during international interventions.
59
 Nonetheless, 
it is appropriate – indeed important – that military and police roles remain distinct, to 
maintain the separation between the two organisations that underpinned “the rise of the 
modern state and the modern state system”.60 
 
Complementary cooperation could nevertheless be enhanced by doctrine, without further 
blurring the roles of each organisation. At what the military would call the operational level, 
doctrine that establishes clear guidelines for areas such as the means of communication 
between the AFP and the ADF, or doctrine concerning security arrangements and intelligence 
sharing would be particularly useful, as these are areas in which cooperation (and indeed 
interoperability) has been relatively difficult to achieve in the past.
61
 Doctrine to enhance 
complementary cooperation could be produced by either organisation (or, preferably, 
collectively), providing that it is developed in close consultation and that its content is 
acceptable to both. Furthermore, doctrine of this nature may have the additional benefit of 
helping to reinforce within the host nation the distinction between police and military roles 
and functions. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Improving the effectiveness of multinational interventions is a crucial goal for the 
international community. With military and police now comprising the vast majority of 
personnel deployed on UN missions, it is critical that they function effectively together. 
International peacekeeping, reconstruction and humanitarian operations take place in complex 
environments, and indeed constitute a complex microcosm within those environments. 
Building mechanisms to manage or minimise this complexity therefore increases capacity to 
focus on improving the environment rather than managing the missions themselves.  
 
This paper has argued that cooperation and interoperability between police and military 
forces, such as the AFP and ADF, would be greatly enhanced through an increased 
understanding of each other’s language and processes. Doctrine exists in each of these forces, 
although in the case of the police it is neither named as such nor written in formal manuals. 
Formalised doctrine – as an authoritative statement of fundamental principles that guide 
actions but require discernment in application – represents a useful tool for cooperation, 
because it spells out the foundational operational ideologies of each force. The clarity 
provided by such a statement thus creates a clear and agreed starting point for building 
understanding, for collaborating, and for identifying areas where interoperability is possible. 
 
Finally, doctrine specifically designed to enhance cooperation and interoperability would 
contribute to improving operational performance during times of major unrest, when 
immediate, coherent action is critical but timeframes allow little or no opportunity to debate 
roles, leadership and approaches. The nature of the countries to which the AFP and ADF are 
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deployed means that this issue is likely to arise repeatedly in the future. Doctrine therefore 
constitutes a significant tool that can be used to contribute to generating better outcomes for 
both deployed forces and local civilians in areas where multinational interventions are 
required. 
 
 
